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Systemic Risk in Global Finance
by Helmut Willke, Zeppelin University
The paper addresses the emergence of sys-
temic risk as a property of global finance. Part 
1 describes two factors of the post-Bretton-
Woods global financial system which John 
Eatwell has singled out as pushing the pro-
pensity for systemic risk: the focus on single 
firms, and a misguided focus on homogene-
ity. Part 2 of the paper then broadens the per-
spective in order to expose some aspects of 
a political economy of systemic risk in global 
finance. Now, after the fact of a global crisis, 
the major controversy is about the nature of 
systemic risk: is it mainly an economic prob-
lem, or is it a political issue, that is, must it be 
understood in terms of political accountabil-
ity and the limits of political regulation? Part 
3 discusses some consequences for regula-
tion and supervision within the context of ir-
reducible conflicts between national egoism 
and global collective goods.
1 Introduction
The veil of ignorance covering the operational 
modes and the consequences of arcane finan-
cial models and instruments becomes a public 
concern as soon as the failure (bankruptcy) of 
financial institutions (banks, investment firms, 
insurance companies, private equity funds, semi-
official mortgage agencies like Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac) threaten to engender system-wide 
consequences. The question is: what are system-
wide consequences?
Systemic repercussions of the (possible) fail-
ure of financial corporations are closely related to 
the notion of “systemic risk”. In general, systemic 
risks emanate from an intransparent interplay of 
layered and leveraged components of a concate-
nated compound. The case of the global financial 
system is an exemplary one, since the focus of 
all governance and regulatory action has been on 
single components, i.e., issuers, Chief Financial 
Officers, individual firms and corporations etc., 
whereas the interplay of these components has 
remained intransparent: “A lack of focus on the 
changing system characteristics of the interna-
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tional financial system has become a character-
istic of international regulatory developments in 
the past few years” (Eatwell 2004, p. 1).
John Eatwell has given an exemplary ac-
count of two of the most acute factors of com-
mon concepts of regulation that actually create 
and enhance systemic risks. The factors he sin-
gles out are (1) the focus on single firms instead 
of a focus on a conglomerated global system of 
finance, and (2) a misguided focus on homoge-
neity instead of a focus on heterogeneity as an 
optimal mix of risk factors.
2 Systemic Risk, Systemic Relevance and 
Systemic Intransparency
2.1 Non-knowledge and Intransparency
In principle, regulation and supervision of the fi-
nancial system through central banks, regulatory 
and supervisory institutions aim at system-wide 
financial stability. In practice, however, critical 
standards and rules, i.e., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
or pillar one of Basel II, address single firms and 
their specific control architectures and risk mod-
els. To be sure, Basel II is an important step in 
establishing a learning mode of the new super-
visory review process, aiming at a cognitive su-
pervisory regime in banking. Still, the focus is on 
single firms and their risk behaviour, neglecting 
structural issues and negative externalities of the 
risk strategies of single firms. New types of op-
erational risks emanating from individual firms 
might coalesce to systemic operational risks and 
market risks that overwhelm the coping capaci-
ties of the individual actors in the financial sys-
tem: “The internal risk management regime – for 
credit and market risk, operational risk, compli-
ance risk – needs to meet a more exacting stand-
ard. The requirements for operational resilience 
for technology systems are necessarily more de-
manding” (Geithner 2004, p. 4). Obviously, this 
also increases the demands on and difficulties of 
financial governance in managing systemic risk.
The shifting grounds for regulatory super-
vision correspond to a marked change in risk 
perception within global finance during the last 
decade. In the 1990s, major risks derived from 
aberrant or criminal behaviour of single firms 
and persons. By 2003, the sources of risks had 
shifted to complex financial instruments and ad-
verse macroeconomic conditions for the business 
strategies of financial institutions. At present, the 
systemic effects of individual risk-taking are 
becoming more accentuated, because the tradi-
tional separation of different types of financial 
institutions, in particular, the separation between 
banks, insurance companies, securities and funds 
(already loosened for the USA by the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999), is undermined by an 
intransparent concatenation of risk propensities 
via diffusing effects of structured credit instru-
ments (Plender 2005). The creation of a mas-
sive “shadow banking system” is intended to 
hide major transactions, to enhance intranspar-
ency and to cover critical aspects of the financial 
system under a veil of ignorance by operating 
outside of regular banking supervision and na-
tional regulation. The shadow banking system 
“is a nexus of private equity and hedge funds, 
money-market funds and auction-rate securities, 
non-banks such as GE Capital and new securities 
such as CDOs and credit-default swaps. […] On 
the eve of the crash, more capital was flowing 
through it than through the conventional banks” 
(Economist 2009, p. 20).1
As the field of options within the financial 
system is extended into the depth of structured 
derivative instruments and into the labyrinths 
of prolonged chains of conditioned events, the 
chances and risks of aggregate or even systemic 
effects of mutual reinforcement, snowballing, 
leverage and positive feedback loops beyond 
single firms loom large. A complex array of op-
tions corresponds to chances of “low-probability, 
high-impact events” (Kohn 2004). A regulatory 
focus on single firms necessarily makes govern-
ance blind for systemic turbulences. These turbu-
lences certainly start with some actions and deci-
sions of firms, like children throwing snow-balls, 
but these actions then turn into avalanches by 
setting off chain reactions that follow the logic 
of the financial system, and defy the motives and 
reasons of the people or single firms involved.
When the bubble bursts and the crisis breaks 
out, systemic risks turn into systemically-relevant 
threats. Again, nobody can know for sure exactly 
what event und exactly what organization/institu-
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tion is systemically relevant. The notion covers 
various aspects: (1) an organization is “too big 
to fail”, meaning that its failure precipitates the 
downfall of an entire sector of the financial sys-
tem; (2) an organization’s failure would kick off 
an avalanche of related failures within the financial 
system, particularly by destroying the quintessen-
tial trust which fuels financial transactions; (3) the 
failure of a sector of the financial system would 
expand into the “real” economy, putting firms and 
jobs at risk, thus impinging on the social security 
system and connecting to politically touchy fields; 
and (4) an organization’s failure would touch off 
social unrest, protest and more violent expressions 
of deception and insecurity by people affected, 
again connecting to politically touchy arenas.
The notion of “systemic relevance” implies 
a responsibility for politics to react to a critical 
state of financial (or economic) affairs. Its defi-
nition derives less from financial/economic rea-
soning than from political judgments of political 
relevance. Politics finds itself in a double bind of 
unavoidable non-knowledge and intransparency: 
political decision-makers have no way of know-
ing the exact financial/economic implication of a 
critical situation, since even most of the financial 
and economic actors involved have no clue to 
what is going on; and they have no way of know-
ing whether or not political action (like bailout, 
guarantees, grants, the creation of “bad banks”, 
or even nationalization of firms, etc.) will solve 
the problem, or whether the solution will be the 
next problem.
An important aspect of the financial sys-
tem’s logic lies in the temporal deep structure of 
capital. Since “financial markets are markets for 
stocks of current and future assets, the value of 
which today is dependent on the expectations of 
their future value” (Eatwell 2004, p. 2), present 
expectations of future asset-price movements 
and future value dynamics must be based on 
past experience as well as on concurrent beliefs, 
assumptions, reasoning and extrapolations of 
distributed knowledge. No person or institution 
commands the knowledge or covers the expertise 
to “run the system”. The system runs itself. Frie-
drich von Hayek has shown this convincingly for 
the “simple” regular market, stressing that only 
the market itself is able to combine the complexi-
ties of distributed knowledge into a construction 
of operating market: “The knowledge of the cir-
cumstances of which we must make use never 
exists in concentrated or integrated form, but 
solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and fre-
quently contradictory knowledge which all the 
separate individuals possess” (Hayek 1945, p. 
519). Even more so, then, the financial markets 
rely on a trans-individual aggregation of knowl-
edge and non-knowledge (uncertainties, risks, 
and ignorance) that no single person or institu-
tion is in a position to direct or avoid.
2.2 Uniformity and Homogeneity in 
Financial Markets
A second form of systemic risk points up the 
idiosyncratic logic of the financial system even 
more clearly. Whereas financial innovations and 
a more elaborate temporal deep structure of fi-
nancial transactions enhance the field of options 
in the financial system, a complementary dynam-
ics can reduce that field of options to a danger-
ous level of uniformity. John Eatwell calls this 
result a state of homogeneity, as opposed to the 
crucial heterogeneity which allows markets to 
prosper: “Markets become illiquid when objec-
tives become homogeneous. When everyone be-
lieves that everyone will sell, liquidity vanishes. 
Markets fall over the cliff when average opinion 
believes that average opinion has lost confidence 
in financial assets” (Eatwell 2004, p. 3). What 
aspects of capital, as a symbolic medium, drive 
financial markets towards homogeneity, instead 
of preserving a more balanced heterogeneity of 
diverse objectives, methodologies, instruments, 
risk models or time horizons?
Surprisingly, the culprits seem to be exactly 
those aspects of capital that are responsible for a 
global financial system coming into being in the 
first place: liberalization, disintermediation, in-
ternationalization, global standards and methods 
of professionalization “and extensive conglom-
eration of financial institutions” (Eatwell 2004, 
p. 4). These factors combine to create a unified 
and uniform space of global finance, character-
ized by global infrastructures, global suprastruc-
tures (i.e., uniform methods, standards, and 
models of regulation and supervision), aligned 
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core business processes and financial products, 
similar business visions, strategy maps, and core 
competencies, coordinated rule systems, risk 
management procedures, and control ideas.
At first glance, these factors seem innocent 
enough, since they contribute to establishing ex-
actly what is at stake – a global financial system. 
The unintended consequences of their perform-
ance, however, seem to be detrimental to the sta-
bility and success of the very system they consti-
tute. This basic ambivalence or built-in contra-
diction is, of course, reminiscent of Marx’ char-
acterization of the capitalist system as inherently 
self-destructive. Ironically, Marx’ diagnosis was 
premature in presupposing circumstances of the 
deterritorialized deployment of capital that only 
the ultimate global breakthrough of the capital-
ist mode of financial operations have brought 
into existence – a constellation which Marx may 
have foreseen by following the logic of the me-
dium of capital.
The astonishingly self-defeating propensity 
of the financial system is closely related to its 
temporal deep structure. In order to understand 
this, it seems helpful to distinguish among three 
levels. The market economy as a functional sub-
system of society fosters heterogeneity because 
the power of competition drives differentiation, 
specialization, a Schumpeterian propensity for 
innovations and a Porterian exploitation of the 
differential competitive advantages of locations 
(Porter 1990). Hence, on a first level in a “sim-
ple” market economy, there is little danger of 
forced homogeneity.
However, the trouble with “herd behaviour” 
and the corresponding urge towards homogene-
ity begins on a second level, when the decisions 
to invest and the decisions to sell/buy are distant 
points in time and therefore lose their automat-
ically-corrective response from the market. The 
famous “hog cycle” points to the problem of 
maintaining heterogeneity when extended time 
frames (i.e., investing in livestock, raising hogs, 
producing meat and selling the product) and 
committed resources prevent a fast and flexible 
reaction to market conditions. Hog cycles still 
exist today, causing serious problems of excess 
production capacity in many fields: the automo-
tive industry, memory chips, computers, mobile 
phones, ship building, etc. The hog cycle builds 
on investors’ exaggerated expectations in times 
of shortages, and results in over-capacities be-
cause “everybody does the same thing” (homo-
geneity) instead of everyone doing their own 
thing (heterogeneity). The metaphor of “cycle” 
is meaningful in this context, since systemic risk 
is, to a considerable degree, a consequence of 
unexpected and unintended cyclical behaviour 
of concatenated financial processes – and a cor-
responding inability of political regulation to 
prevent pro-cyclical, self-reinforcing dynamic 
processes – hence the focus of the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (and 
other institutions) on instruments and measures 
to initiate “counter-cyclical” effects within ongo-
ing financial dynamics (Elliott 2011).
On a third level, the level of the financial 
system, the long-term cyclicity of the real econ-
omy is replaced and enhanced by the short-term 
and ultra-short-term cyclicity of electronic finan-
cial flows. It takes considerable experience and 
expertise for people to direct their interventions 
in a way that avoids unintended or detrimental 
consequences. It is important to recognize (and 
it takes a bit of courage to admit) “that we do 
not know a lot about the underlying dynamics of 
financial crises in the context of the evolving fi-
nancial system” (Geithner 2004, p. 4).
3 Towards a Political-economical Approach 
to Systemic Risk in Global Finance
Systemic risk undermines political legitimacy, 
because it forces national polities to step in with 
public money to save systemically-important in-
stitutions which are “too big to fail” –, meaning 
that their failure would do even more damage to 
public goods (Goldstein, Véron 2011). Indeed, 
banks have actively merged in order to cross the 
threshold to become “systemically important” 
(Brewer, Jagtiani 2009), and to enjoy the advan-
tage of being “too big to fail” (TBTF) (Baker, 
McArthur 2009). Actually, political systems are 
being taken hostage by huge banks and other fi-
nancial institutions, creating pervasive problems 
of moral hazard and misguided incentives (Rajan 
2010, p. 170). “Government policy toward TBTF 
firms, which has frequently resulted in privatiza-
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tion of gains and socialization of losses – when 
combined with executive compensation at TBTF 
firms that bears little relation to relative per-
formance – has also lowered public trust in the 
‘fairness’ of the financial and economic system” 
(Goldstein 2011, p. 10). The goal of multi-level 
policy responses to system risk must be to avoid 
the forced choice between massive public bail-
outs and market chaos (Levitin 2011).
The challenge, then, is to cope with uncer-
tainty and ignorance in governing complex sys-
tems. For most global institutions, this is daily 
business, and they would not even think about 
solid truths and immovable expectations as 
guidelines for their operations. Some agents of 
global governance, i.e., the WHO, the IMF or 
the IRC are quite proficient in handling risks and 
coping with uncertainty as inevitable aspects of 
their world. From the vantage point of global po-
litical economy, the disturbing part of the knowl-
edge paradox is not an inability or unwillingness 
of global actors to confront and manage uncer-
tainty. It rather concerns a deficient appreciation 
of the levels and consequences of ignorance and 
uncertainty. There is an abundance of knowl-
edge about non-knowledge and pertinent coping 
strategies for uncertainty at the level of persons. 
In stark contrast, analysis and practice are just 
beginning to look at the same phenomena at the 
level of social systems. Collective intelligence 
and systemic risks are just emerging as serious 
topics of governance theory and practice (Eat-
well 2004; Krahnen, Wilde 2006).
The financial crisis can be seen as a “nor-
mal accident” in Charles Perrow’s sense (Perrow 
1984), that is, a temporary breakdown of a com-
plex high-risk system. To be sure, the ramifica-
tions of this special case of “accident” are be-
yond most people’s imagination, the costs are as-
tronomical, and will extend well into future gen-
erations. But, in essence, the operational logic of 
this system failure appears to be similar to other 
catastrophes in other complex, tightly-coupled 
socio/technical systems. The global financial 
system is even more complex, since it comprises 
an array of high-tech infrastructural and opera-
tional systems including sophisticated software 
on the one hand, and complex social interactions 
and relations on the other.
In addition, it has evolved from a loosely-
coupled system, separated by national borders and 
jurisdictions and by separate business models for 
different types of financial institutions, into a tight-
ly-coupled system, concatenated by “structured” 
financial products, cascaded firm and fund struc-
tures, globally interrelated financial conglomer-
ates and homogeneous business models across the 
board. Appropriately, Amar Bhidé has called the 
global banking crisis “an accident waiting to hap-
pen” (Bhidé 2009). The Second Warwick Com-
mission has, for these reasons, argued in favour of 
a “praise of unlevel playing fields” (The Warwick 
2010). And Raghuram Rajan calls the homogene-
ity of concepts “cognitive capture” of most of the 
actors involved (Rajan 2010, p. 181).
To clarify the notion of systemic risk in 
global finance, it is helpful to assume three core 
system’s features of global finance which invite 
systemic risk: (1) global concatenation, (2) con-
tagion, and (3) tight coupling.
(1) In practical terms, the global financial 
system has achieved nearly total concatenation 
after the demise of the Bretton-Woods limita-
tions, and after the recall in 1999 of the Glass-
Steagall Act, which was enacted in 1933, explic-
itly to separate the business spheres of banks, 
investment firms and insurance companies, in or-
der to create more transparency in various types 
of financial businesses. During the 1990s, and, in 
particular, in the period from 2000 to 2007, every 
financial institution was connected to many other 
institutions via a variety of financial instruments, 
which included opaque risks. The situation was 
aggravated by the gradual emergence of a vast 
shadow banking system which evaded all official 
frameworks of regulation and control.
Gradually, global finance has been trans-
formed into a thoroughly concatenated and inter-
connected system with complex interaction of its 
parts. It is characterized by strong correlations and 
interdependencies between the components of the 
system, a vanishing of borders and limitations, a 
re-emergence of general-purpose financial institu-
tions, an emergence of financial institutions held 
to be “too big to fail”, an increasing influence of 
overall actors like rating agencies and global fi-
nancial players, an emergence of a shadow bank-
ing system which reinforces interrelations and 
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stacked dependencies, a growing homogeneity 
of basic economic assumptions as represented by 
the “Washington consensus” (Williamson 1990), 
a striking uniformity of business models and risk 
strategies, leading most actors and firms to look 
in the same direction and to disregard the same 
risks. “Large and complex financial conglomer-
ates now have hundreds – and sometimes thou-
sands – of majority-owned subsidiaries, with a 
high percentage of those subsidiaries located in 
foreign locations” (Goldstein 2011, p. 10).
(2) Contagion is a feature of a tightly-con-
nected (global) financial system. An interna-
tionally- or even globally-diversified portfolio 
makes sense if investors want to protect them-
selves against specific-country risks. If, however, 
a crisis looms, then the connections and relations 
used to diversify may backfire, and produce un-
anticipated shocks. Crisis contagion happens 
when a faltering economy or a financial crisis 
in one country spreads to an otherwise healthy 
economy or financial system of another country. 
Contagion is aggravated by “rational” herding 
behavior of international investors and by ho-
mogeneous concepts, investing and disinvesting 
strategies, which lead to massive cumulative ef-
fects (Krugman 2009, p. 93). Even the highly-
sophisticated and sensible rules of Basel II have 
proven to work in a pro-cyclical manner during 
the recent financial crisis, thus exacerbating the 
dangers of contagion.
(3) A tightly-coupled financial system is like 
an elaborate domino-edifice which looks good in 
times of prosperity, but which may collapse dra-
matically in times of stress. Karl Weick’s insights 
into the consequences of loose and strict coupling 
(1976) will be used to shed some light on a per-
plexing recent transformation of global finance 
from a loosely- to a strictly-coupled system. This 
structural change has altered the risk predisposi-
tion of the entire system of global capitalism. It 
has created new levels of systemic risk, because 
tight coupling of the system’s elements increases 
its vulnerability through rapid contagion and an 
uncontrolled spread of toxic ingredients.
Tight coupling has also been increased 
by structured financial products like CDO’s or 
CDS’2 which combine – and thus tightly con-
nect – diverse businesses, branches, regions and 
types of financial firms, like banks and insuranc-
es: “Diversifying risk through hedging increases 
linkages among market participants, which, at 
least in part, could offset the risk-spreading and 
foster systemic risk” (Schwarcz 2008, p. 221).
Whereas the details of setting up adequate 
firewalls must be left to financial experts, for po-
litical economy and governance theory, the prob-
lem of implementing the principle of subsidiarity 
relates to the architecture of global finance – that 
is, the need to change from a tightly- to a loosely-
coupled system. A crucial case in point is secu-
ritization in general and mortgage securitization 
in particular.
As soon as securitization creates special-
purpose vehicles (SPVs), structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs), or special purpose enterprises 
(SPEs) for these vehicles from an underly-
ing pool of mortgages (or mortgages combined 
with other debts), the quality of financial busi-
ness changes from regular banking to leveraged 
investing: “The key to securitization is that the 
SPV finances its purchases of cash flows from 
mortgages by issuing securities, which are then 
called residential mortgage backed securities 
(RBMS) or commercial mortgage backed secu-
rities (CMBS) because they are backed by the 
payments by the holders of the mortgages in the 
SPV portfolio” (Sinn 2009, p. 63). A change in 
the quality or level of financial transaction occurs 
because a new intermediary is entering the stage, 
and because the original holder of the mortgage – 
and his/her risk propensity – disappears behind a 
compound aggregate of bundled securities. Note 
that even the rating agencies have been misled 
by this “disappearance act” to give routinely high 
ratings for these bundles.
Disconnecting this form of tight coupling 
through intermediaries according to the principle 
of subsidiarity would imply explicitly creating 
a new next level of financial transactions. This 
separates these kinds of securitization from “reg-
ular” banking business, and confines it to a sepa-
rate form of enterprise (e.g., “Special Purpose 
Enterprises”, which are but components of the 
shadow banking system). This enterprise is then 
subordinated to specific rules and regulations. 
For example, these rules would have to include 
an answer to the question whether the original 
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mortgage holder has to consent to the sale of his/
her mortgage, or has a right to veto it.
CDS’ are a second case in point related to the 
first example. CDS-contracts are quasi-insurance 
contracts, because the buyer pays a premium, 
and, in return, will receive a sum of money if one 
of the events specified in the contract, e.g., de-
fault of a credit or bankruptcy of a firm, happens. 
Apart from the moral-hazard problem involved, 
the instrument mixes elements of investment and 
insurance, thus increasing tight coupling between 
investment- and insurance activities. The case is 
particularly problematic, because the insurance 
industry is strongly regulated and subjected, for 
example, to Solvency II as a regulatory- and in-
ternal control framework. But the existing control 
frameworks are not adapted to the new mixture 
of elements, since the seller of CDS need not be 
a regulated entity, and the controls are useless in 
view of highly-leveraged and structured risk port-
folios characteristic for sophisticated investment 
(but not for the insurance business).
4 Outlook: Consequences for Regulation 
and Supervision
The consequences for defining, understanding 
and managing financial systemic risk are far 
from clear. Presumably, no expert would advo-
cate a single overall solution in view of a highly 
complex and sophisticated problem like system-
ic risk. And, in principle, it is easy to agree to 
the idea of the benefits of “cognitive diversity” 
for handling exceedingly complicated problem 
constellations. However, the discord and vicis-
situdes of the international discussion following 
the global financial crisis are to some extent dis-
heartening. The national states and, in particular, 
the EU, have missed an opportunity to perform 
adequately: “The collective performance was 
inelegant, not least inside the European Union. 
[…] the crisis underlined the crucial importance 
of much better collaborative instruments for the 
oversight and stabilization of integrating finan-
cial markets” (Pauly 2009, p. 955). In spite of 
obvious and looming systemic risks, the political 
actors in the advanced democratic national states 
fear the next election more than systemic risk.
It seems a long way to go until the “tragedy 
of the commons” quality of systemic risk is suf-
ficiently appreciated to bring competing national 
states to commonly-agreed solutions. The ben-
efits of a vibrant and innovative global financial 
system are huge, but they accrue in exceedingly 
differential proportions to different market par-
ticipants, “each of whom is motivated to maxi-
mize use of the resource, whereas the costs of 
exploitation, which affect the real economy, are 
distributed among an even wider class of per-
sons” and finally burden the public budgets (and 
their staggering deficits) of the national states in-
volved (Schwarcz 2011, p. 206).
The first and foremost consequence of sys-
temic risk in global finance, therefore, appears to 
be to build institutions of global rule-making in 
finance. It does not have to be and probably will 
not be a single institution – like the WTO for glo-
bal trade, or the WHO for global health – but it 
might be a small number of institutions with dis-
tributed expertise and responsibilities centered 
around the Financial Stability Board for gen-
eral policy and principles, the Base Committee 
on Banking Supervision for banking regulation, 
and the IMF for money and credit policies. This 
supervisory network might be complemented by 
activities by the USA and the EU at the national/
transnational level to institute systemic risk-
oversight councils, in order explicitly to include 
a macro-prudential and long-term view in their 
supervisory actions (Katz, Christie 2010, p. 2).
Notes
1) CDO stands for Collateralized Debt Obligation.
2) CDS stands for Credit Default Swaps.
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